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We review a program of research that has suggested that affective states high in
motivationally intensity (e.g., enthusiasm, disgust) narrow cognitive scope, whereas
affective states low in motivationally intensity (e.g., joy, sadness) broaden cognitive scope.
Further supporting this interpretation, indices of brain activations, derived from human
electroencephalography, suggest that the motivational intensity of the affective state
predicts the narrowing of cognitive scope. Finally, research suggests that the relationship
between emotive intensity and cognitive scope is bi-directional, such that manipulated
changes in cognitive scope influence early brain activations associated with emotive
intensity. In the end, the review highlights how emotion can impair and improve certain
cognitive processes.
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We review research that has examined the effects of emotional
states varying in motivational intensity on cognitive scope (nar-
rowing/broadening). This research may yield insight into the
issues with which this special issue is concerned. In particular, the
research sheds light on the circumstances in which emotion may
enhance vs. impair cognition and identifies individual differences
that influence these effects.
Emotions (affective states) are complex psychophysiological
constructs composed of many underlying dimensions. We define
valence as the positive to negative evaluation of the subjec-
tively experienced state (Harmon-Jones et al., 2011a,c). We define
motivational intensity as the urge to move toward/away from a
stimulus; it can range from low to high (Harmon-Jones et al.,
in press). Arousal, as measured subjectively and by activation of
the sympathetic nervous system, is often posited to be a proxy
for motivational intensity (Bradley and Lang, 2007). We concur
with this definition but also posit that motivational intensity and
arousal may be separable, as when one is aroused but not driven
to engage in action (e.g., caffeine).
Our program of research has examined how affective states
differing in motivational intensity influence the broadening or
narrowing of cognition, which is defined as similar to cognitive
expansiveness. It can occur at attentional or conceptual levels,
it may involve the amount of information available in central
executive resources (for comparing, maintaining, and manipulat-
ing) as well as perceptual resources (e.g., encoding), and it has
been used in past discussions of the effects of emotions on cogni-
tion (e.g., Fredrickson, 2001). It has been measured in a number
of ways, such as local/global attentional scope (Fredrickson and
Branigan, 2005), visual selective attention (Rowe et al., 2007;
Moriya and Nittono, 2011), perceptual encoding in the visual
cortices (Schmitz et al., 2009), cognitive categorization (Isen and
Daubman, 1984), and unusualness of associations (Isen et al.,
1985).
As will be reviewed, affective states low in motivational inten-
sity cause broadening, whereas affective states high in motiva-
tional intensity cause narrowing of cognitive scope. Thus, with
regard to whether affective states impair or enhance cognition,
we suggest on the basis of our research that certain affective
states can enhance certain aspects of cognition while simultane-
ously impairing other aspects of cognition. Below, we explain our
position in more detail.
POSITIVE AFFECTS VARY IN MOTIVATIONAL INTENSITY
Most previous research on the relationship between affective
states and cognitive scope (broad vs. narrow) has examined pos-
itive affective states low in motivational intensity (amusement)
and negative affective states high in motivational intensity (fear;
Harmon-Jones and Gable, 2008). This confounding of affective
valence with motivational intensity makes it difficult to claim that
positive affect broadens (Fredrickson, 2001) and negative affect
narrows cognitive scope (Easterbrook, 1959).
The prior research manipulated positive affect via gifts (Isen
and Daubman, 1984), recall of past positive events (Gasper
and Clore, 2002), or clips of humorous or satisfying events
(Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005). We suggest that the positive
affective state created by these manipulations is low in approach
motivation because these manipulations create relatively passive
states not associated with goal pursuit. Other positive affec-
tive states are higher in approach motivation, but they were
not examined in past research on positive affect and cognitive
scope.
This distinction between low and high approach motivated
positive affect (which is on a continuum) is similar to other con-
ceptualizations, such as ones that posit that appetitive or pre-goal
positive states are different from consummatory or post-goal pos-
itive states (Knutson and Wimmer, 2007). Pre-goal and post-goal
positive affect states are associated with different neural structures
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and neurochemicals (Panksepp, 1998; Knutson and Wimmer,
2007; Harmon-Jones et al., 2008).
We posit that pre-goal, high approach-motivated positive
affective states, such as desire and enthusiasm, narrow cogni-
tive scope, so that organisms are not distracted by peripheral
details that may impede goal pursuit. In contrast, post-goal, low
approach-motivated positive affective states, such as satisfaction,
promote openness to new opportunities. After the goal is accom-
plished, a broad cognitive scope allows new goal opportunities to
be identified and later pursued. Low approach-motivated negative
affect, such as sadness, also broadens cognitive scope. When goals
are terminally blocked and motivation lowers, broadened atten-
tion may assist in finding new solutions to the goal or finding a
new goal.
ATTENTIONAL SCOPE FOLLOWING LOW vs. HIGH
APPROACH POSITIVE AFFECT
In our program of research, we measured attentional scope using
two commonly used measures of local/global processing. The
first, the Kimchi and Palmer (1982) task, presents several trials.
In each trial, three figures, each comprising three to nine local
elements (triangles or squares), are presented. One figure, the
standard, is positioned on top, and the two other figures, the com-
parisons, are positioned below. One of the comparison figures has
local elements that matched the local elements of the standard,
whereas the other comparison figure has a global element that
matches the global element of the standard. Thus, judgments of
which comparison figure are more similar to the standard figure
are based on either the global element of one comparison figure
or the local elements of the other comparison figure. Participants
indicate their “first and most immediate impression” as to which
of the two comparison figures in each triad best matches the stan-
dard figure, and their choice indicates whether they were more
locally (narrowly) or globally (broadly) focused at the moment.
The second, the Navon (1977) letters task, also presents several
trials. The stimuli in the letters task are large letters composed of
smaller letters. Each vertical and horizontal line of a large letter
is made up of five closely spaced local letters (e.g., an H made up
of Fs). Participants are asked to indicate “as quickly as possible”
whether the picture contains the letter T or the letter H, by press-
ing one button for T and another button forH. Global targets are
those in which a T or anH is composed of smaller Ls or Fs. Local
targets are those in which a large L or F is composed of smaller Ts
or Hs. Faster responses to the large than to the small letters indi-
cate a global (broad) focus, whereas faster responses to the small
than to the large letters indicates a local (narrow) focus.
To test the effects of low vs. high approach-motivated posi-
tive affect on attentional scope (using the Kimchi and Palmer,
1982, task), low approach positive affect was created with a film
clip of funny cats, and high approach positive affect was cre-
ated with a film clip of desserts (Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008,
Experiment 1). Self-report manipulation checks indicated that
the appropriate positive affective states were evoked without any
negative affect. In support of the hypothesis, the dessert film
(which caused high approach positive affect) caused less broad-
ening of attention than the funny cats film (which caused low
approach positive affect).
Other experiments found that dessert pictures caused more
narrowing of attention than neutral pictures (Gable andHarmon-
Jones, 2008, Experiment 2). Also, individuals who scored higher
in trait approach motivation showed even more narrowing of
attention following appetitive pictures (Gable and Harmon-
Jones, 2008, Experiment 3). Increased approach motivation
caused by leading individuals to believe they would get to eat
desserts following picture viewing evoked even more narrow-
ing of attention (Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008, Experiment 4).
In addition, alcohol-related pictures cause narrowed attention
for individuals who are motivated to consume alcohol (Hicks
et al., 2012). The above experiments measured attentional scope
with the Navon (1977) task. These positive affect manipulations
increase self-reported positive affect (e.g., excited, enthusiastic)
but not negative affect.
EVOKING LOW vs. HIGH APPROACH-MOTIVATED
POSITIVE AFFECT WITH MONEY
Other experiments have tested the primary hypothesis by evoking
positive affect using stimuli other than emotional pictures. Low
vs. high approach positive affect was manipulated in one exper-
iment using the monetary incentive delay paradigm (Knutson
et al., 2000; Knutson and Wimmer, 2007). In this task, cues
indicating the possibility of gaining money for task performance
are used to evoke pre-goal (high approach) positive affect, and
different cues indicating the outcome of the task performance
(whether a reward was obtained) are used to evoke post-goal (low
approach) positive affect.
In one experiment (Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2010a), cog-
nitive scope was measured by assessing recognition memory for
neutral words that were presented either in the center of the com-
puter monitor or in the periphery of the computer monitor. We
found that superior memory for centrally presented words after
pre-goal positive affect cues than after post-goal positive affect
cues. In contrast, memory for peripherally presented words was
superior after post-goal positive affect cues than pre-goal pos-
itive affect cues. Two experiments have conceptually replicated
these results with Navon’s (1977) local/global attentional scope
task (Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2011a).
PERCEPTUAL vs. CONCEPTUAL PROCESSING FOLLOWING
LOW vs. HIGH APPROACH POSITIVE AFFECT
To test whether low vs. high approach positive affect would influ-
ence other, more conceptual cognitive processes, we conducted
two experiments in which narrowing/broadening of cognition
was measured using Isen and Daubman’s (1984) cognitive cat-
egorization task (Price and Harmon-Jones, 2010). In addition,
we manipulated low and high approach positive states with an
embodiment manipulation (Harmon-Jones et al., 2011b). In the
high approach positive affect condition, participants smiled and
leaned forward in a chair, similar to how one might lean toward
an object of desire. In the low approach positive affect condi-
tion, participants smiled and reclined backward in a reclining
chair, similar to how one might recline after goal accomplish-
ment. In a moderate approach positive affect condition, partic-
ipants sat upright and smiled. In the categorization task, which
was completed while participants were in one of these postures,
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participants rated the extent to which weakly associated exem-
plars (e.g., camel) of a particular category (e.g., vehicle) fit within
that category. The high approach positive condition produced the
most narrow categorizations (i.e., participants were more likely
to indicate that the exemplars did not belong to the category),
followed by the moderate approach positive condition, and then
the low approach positive condition.
NEUROSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
To examine neural processes underlying the effects of approach
positive affect on cognitive narrowing, we have conducted
experiments using measures of electrical brain activity. In one
experiment (Harmon-Jones and Gable, 2009), we measured elec-
troencephalographic (EEG) alpha power to neutral and dessert
picture primes and measured attentional scope following each
prime using the Navon (1977) letters task. We focused on asym-
metric frontal cortical activity, because greater relative left frontal
cortical activity has been found to relate to approach motivation
(Coan and Allen, 2004; Harmon-Jones et al., 2010). Results indi-
cated that greater relative left frontal activity to the dessert pic-
tures (but not neutral pictures) predicted attentional narrowing
immediately following the dessert picture primes (Harmon-Jones
and Gable, 2009).
In another experiment, we used the same methods (affective
pictures and Navon letters task) but examined event-related brain
potentials (ERP), specifically the late positive potential (LPP) of
the ERP (Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2010b), which is sensitive to
the motivational significance of stimuli (for review, see Hajcak
et al., 2012).We found that the LPP was larger to dessert than neu-
tral pictures. This LPP effect occurred over several brain regions,
including medial central and parietal cortices. It also showed an
asymmetric effect over the frontal cortex, with the dessert pic-
tures evoking larger LPPs over the left than right frontal cortex.
Importantly, LPPs to dessert pictures predicted attentional nar-
rowing following the dessert pictures (no significant correlations
were observed for neutral stimuli).
COMPARING NEGATIVE AFFECTIVE STATES DIFFERING
IN MOTIVATIONAL INTENSITY
Based on the reviewed research, we suggest that the motiva-
tional intensity of the positive affect determines whether positive
affect causes broadening or narrowing of cognitive scope. Does
the motivational intensity of the negative affective state influ-
ence cognitive scope? Some past research on depression suggested
that low intensity negative affect causes broadening (von Hecker
and Meiser, 2005). We examined whether negative affects vary-
ing in motivational intensity influence cognitive scope (Gable
and Harmon-Jones, 2010c). Low motivationally intense nega-
tive affect was created with pictures of sad events, whereas high
motivationally intense negative affect was created with pictures
of disgusting events. Both types of pictures evoked greater self-
reported negative affect than neutral pictures did. However, sad
pictures evoked lower self-reported arousal than disgust pictures.
This suggests that the disgust pictures evoked greater motiva-
tional intensity than the sadness pictures. Conceptually consistent
with the positive affect results, sad pictures broadened attention,
whereas disgust pictures narrowed attention relative to neutral
pictures (measured with the Navon, 1977, task).
In contrast to the above results, past studies suggest different
outcomes for sadness. Gasper and Clore (2002) had partici-
pants write about “a personal life event that had made them feel
either ‘happy and positive’ or ‘sad and negative’.” In Study 1, the
manipulation check was similarly worded. In Study 2, the same
manipulation was used and negative affect was measured with
a wide array of negative emotion words. Gasper and Clore aver-
aged all of these words together, suggesting that the affective state
manipulated was a mix of negative states and not sadness alone.
Rowe et al. (2007) found no differences between a neutral state
and a sad state on attentional narrowing. We suggest that the
effect of sadness on attentional scope may depend on whether
the sadness evoked is lower or higher in motivational intensity;
the latter may occur when sadness is mixed with other negative
affects. Research is needed to test this idea.
These results suggest the need for a concept that explains how
certain positive (e.g., desire) and negative (e.g., disgust) affects
cause narrowing, whereas other positive (e.g., amusement) and
negative (e.g., sadness) affects cause broadening. We suggest that
the concept of motivational intensity explains these effects: low
motivationally intense affects broaden cognitive scope whereas
high motivationally intense affects narrow cognitive scope.
AFFECTIVE STATES, AROUSAL, AND MOTIVATIONAL
INTENSITY
Does arousal rather than motivational intensity better explain
how these different affective states influence cognitive scope? If
arousal is the same as motivational intensity, as some have posited
(Bradley and Lang, 2007), then the arousal explanation is the
same as the motivational intensity explanation.
On the other hand, arousal and motivational intensity may
occasionally be separate constructs. Humor evokes an arous-
ing state that is low in approach motivational intensity: humor
does not urge action toward something. Humorous films cause
more attentional broadening than neutral films (Fredrickson and
Branigan, 2005; Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008), thus suggesting
that arousal per se cannot account for the effect of high approach
positive affective states on attentional narrowing.
We recently tested another instance where arousal andmotiva-
tional intensity are separable. That is, arousal can be prompted
by physical exercise but this state is not necessarily associated
with motivational intensity (Gable and Harmon-Jones, under
review). In this experiment, participants were randomly assigned
to pedal a stationary bike or not while performing the appet-
itive vs. neutral picture/attentional scope task (Navon, 1977).
Individuals who pedaled had faster heart rates than individu-
als who did not. More importantly, manipulated arousal had
no effect on attentional scope. These results suggest that moti-
vational intensity, rather than arousal per se, causes attentional
narrowing.
THE EFFECT OF COGNITIVE SCOPE ON MOTIVATIONAL
INTENSITY
Several experiments have revealed that affective states differ-
ing in motivational intensity influence attentional scope. Does
attentional scope influence motivational intensity? Focusing nar-
rowly on a motivationally significant object may increase moti-
vation for the object, whereas considering the same object
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from a broader perspective may decrease motivation for the
object.
We have tested this hypothesis in two experiments with appet-
itive and aversive stimuli. In these tests, we examined motiva-
tional processing by measuring ERPs to appetitive and neutral
pictures. We focused on the N1 component, an early ERP compo-
nent related to selective attention that is larger to motivationally
significant stimuli (Keil et al., 2001; Foti et al., 2009).
Immediately prior to the presentation of each affective or
neutral picture, attentional scope was manipulated by having par-
ticipants simply indicate what letter was displayed at the local
or global level in a between-subjects design. That is, participants
viewed Navon (1977) letters and indicated the letter that was dis-
played as a local element or they indicated the letter that was
displayed in the global configuration.
As compared to a global attentional scope, a local atten-
tional scope caused larger N1 amplitudes to appetitive (Gable
and Harmon-Jones, 2011b) and aversive pictures (Gable and
Harmon-Jones, under review) but not to neutral pictures. These
results suggest that the relationship between narrowed attentional
scope and motivational intensity is bi-directional. Other work
suggests that priming a local vs. global attentional scope can influ-
ence how positive and negative moods (with unknown levels of
motivational intensity) influence attentional scope (Huntsinger
et al., 2010).
CONCLUSION
The evidence we reviewed suggests a revision to the well-accepted
idea that positive affect broadens and negative affect narrows
the scope of cognition. The reviewed evidence is consistent
with previous evidence but suggests that previous results likely
occurred because affective valence was confounded with motiva-
tional intensity: low motivationally intense positive affects were
compared with high motivationally intense negative affects. The
reviewed research manipulated affective valence independently
of motivational intensity, and found that affective states low
in motivational intensity broaden and affective states high in
motivational intensity narrow the scope of cognition. Further
research is needed to investigate the role of specific neural regions
(e.g., amygdala, nucleus accumbens) and neurochemical pro-
cesses (e.g., dopamine, opioids) within these regions in the effect
of emotive states on attentional scope.
We suspect that motivationally intense affective states cause
narrowing of cognitive scope because this often facilitates adap-
tive behavior that results in goal accomplishment (approach
or avoidance of the stimulus). However, the narrowed cogni-
tive scope that occurs with high motivationally intense affec-
tive states may hinder perception and processing of peripheral
(or global) information that would prove useful. On the other
hand, low motivationally intense affective states broaden cog-
nitive scope, which may allow new goal opportunities to be
identified and later pursued. However, the broadened scope
that occurs with low motivationally intense affective states
may hinder perception and processing of central (or local)
information that would prove useful. Together, this body of
research suggests that emotion may impair and improve cogni-
tive processes depending on the situation in which the emotion
occurs.
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